Conditional Access starter policies for a small Microsoft 365 tenant
Conditional Access is the if-then engine for Microsoft Entra ID: if this user signs in to this resource from this device, then require MFA, require a compliant device, or block the sign-in. For a small tenant, you do not need dozens of policies on day one. You need a short foundation set, tested in report-only mode, with emergency accounts excluded so a typo cannot lock you out.
Prerequisites
- Microsoft Entra ID P1 (included in Microsoft 365 Business Premium and Microsoft 365 E3). Risk-based policies need P2, which is not required for the starter set below.
- Security defaults off only after equivalents exist. You cannot run security defaults and Conditional Access together. Recreate the protections first, then disable security defaults. The sequence is in our security defaults vs Conditional Access guide and in Microsoft's deployment planning article.
- Emergency access accounts already created and ready to exclude from every policy that could block sign-in. Follow Microsoft Learn, Manage emergency access accounts, and our practical checklist.
- Users can register MFA. If you will require MFA, people need a path to register security info before the policy is enforced, or you will generate lockouts and help-desk tickets at the same time.
Use Microsoft's templates, then fix the exclusions
In the Microsoft Entra admin center, go to Entra ID > Conditional Access > Create new policy from templates. Microsoft groups recommended policies into categories. The Secure foundation category is the official starting set for all organizations. The templates are documented in Conditional Access templates.
Two details from that article matter more than the pretty list:
- Policies created from a template start in report-only mode. Leave them there until you have reviewed sign-in results.
- A template policy excludes only the user who created it. It does not automatically exclude your emergency access accounts or service accounts. Edit each policy after creation and add those exclusions yourself.
A starter set for a small tenant
Deploy these as a group, still in report-only mode. They map to Microsoft's Secure foundation templates and to individual policy how-to articles.
| Policy | What it should do | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Require MFA for all users | All users, all resources, grant: require multifactor authentication (or an authentication strength that includes MFA). | Microsoft's walkthrough: Require MFA for all users. Exclude emergency accounts and any documented legacy exception you still need during the transition. |
| Require MFA for administrators | Directory roles that are privileged (Global Administrator and the other admin roles Microsoft lists in the template), all resources, require MFA — preferably a phishing-resistant authentication strength such as passkey (FIDO2) or certificate-based authentication. | Push and SMS MFA can be relayed by adversary-in-the-middle kits. Phishing-resistant methods are the stronger target for admin roles. |
| Require MFA for Azure management | Target the Microsoft Azure Management app (Azure portal, Azure Resource Manager, and related endpoints) and require MFA. | This replaces the "protect privileged activities such as the Azure portal" control in security defaults. |
| Block legacy authentication | All users, all resources, condition: client apps = Exchange ActiveSync and Other clients, grant: block. | Microsoft's walkthrough: Block legacy authentication. Check sign-in logs for legacy clients before you switch the policy to on, so you know which mail or sync tools will break. |
| Secure security info registration | Restrict who can register security info, and from where, so an attacker who has a password cannot easily add their own MFA method. | Microsoft's walkthrough: Securing security info registration. Plan a temporary exception or a registration window for users who have not enrolled yet. |
| Require MFA for Microsoft admin portals | Target the Microsoft admin portals and require MFA for the roles that use them. | Included in the Secure foundation list. Helps even if a broad "all resources" MFA policy has an accidental gap. |
Microsoft also publishes a template that requires a compliant or Microsoft Entra hybrid joined device, or MFA, for all users, and a stricter "require compliant device" template. Add those only after Intune compliance policies are assigned and devices are actually reporting as compliant. A Windows starter policy is in our Intune compliance policy guide. Turning on "require compliant device" before enrollment is a reliable way to lock people out of email on the first day of a rollout. See the compliant or hybrid joined or MFA policy article, and pair device requirements with your wave-based Intune rollout.
Test in report-only mode, then enforce
Report-only mode evaluates the policy at sign-in but does not enforce it. Results appear on the Conditional Access and Report-only tabs of the sign-in log. You will see outcomes such as success, failure, user action required, or not applied. "User action required" is common for MFA policies: the policy would have prompted the user, but report-only does not prompt.
Review logs for at least several working days, including people who travel, use mobile mail clients, or run scheduled scripts. If you have an Azure Monitor workspace, Microsoft documents a Conditional Access insights workbook for a wider view.
When the results match what you intend, switch each policy from report-only to on, one at a time, and watch the help desk. Conditional Access is enforced after first-factor authentication: it is not a substitute for blocking leaked passwords or for DDoS protection, which Microsoft also notes in the policy articles.
Exclusions to get right
Microsoft's legacy-authentication article recommends excluding:
- Emergency access / break-glass accounts, so a policy mistake is recoverable.
- Service accounts that still need a protocol you have not replaced. The long-term fix is to retire those protocols or move the workload to a managed identity or a workload-identity policy, not to leave a standing hole.
Be careful with "trusted locations" as an MFA bypass. If you exclude a whole office IP range from MFA, an attacker who reaches that network — or spoofs it — inherits the bypass. Prefer requiring MFA everywhere and using locations as an extra signal, not as a way to turn MFA off.
After every new policy, sign in with an emergency account and confirm it still works, then confirm the alert you configured for that sign-in actually fired.
Keep a record
Name policies consistently, document why each exclusion exists, and review exclusions on a schedule. These controls map to the identity section of our quarterly Microsoft 365 security audit checklist. The Tenant Security Audit Kit includes them with where-to-verify paths, licensing notes and scoring so the starter set does not quietly decay.